

GV101

Introduction to Political Science

Week 10: Holding Politicians Accountable

Classes, Monday 09 December 2019

Joe Greenwood




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Formative Problem Set Feedback: UK Grade Structure

- 70 – 100: First Class
- 60 – 69: Upper Second Class
- 50 – 59: Lower Second Class
- 40 – 49: Third Class
- 0 – 39: Fail

Formative Problem Set Feedback: Consider Significance



Essential Reading Overview

- Keefer and Khemani talk about a ‘political market’ in which the accountability of politicians can be undermined by: ‘lack of information among voters about the performance of politicians, social fragmentation among voters manifested as identity-based voting, and lack of credibility of political promises to citizens.’ Illustrative examples of Uttar Pradesh and Kerala, which have the same institutional infrastructure and similar GDP per capita but different public policy outcomes, they argue, due to differing literacy levels, party competition and credibility, and cleavages.
- Ferraz and Finan compare the levels of corruption (detected in local government audits in Brazil) amongst first-term and second-term mayors, finding higher levels in the latter. Argue that this is due to re-election incentives affecting (potentially) corrupt politicians. Also observe that media, local prosecutors, large electoral advantage, and local legislature advantage reduce the effect of re-election incentives. Run lots of robustness checks such as discontinuity analysis.

Real-World Example

*U.K. Democracy, Tested by Brexit
and Boris Johnson, Holds for Now*

