

Constitution Convention Simulation

- Details:
 - 9am – 6pm, Saturday 21 March, NAB, free lunch
 - Design and present constitutions for hypothetical countries and the United Kingdom
- Expert Judges:
 - Professor Pippa Catterall, School of Humanities, University of Westminster; Hansard Society Scholar
 - Professor Tony Travers, Department of Government and School of Public Policy, LSE
 - Dr Ruxandra Serban, Department of Methodology, LSE; formerly UCL Constitution Unit
- Prizes for the Winning Team:
 - Dinner with the expert judges
 - Trip to Parliament's Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, and opportunity to meet its members
- Contact Joe Greenwood-Hau to reserve a space: j.greenwood3@lse.ac.uk



GV101

Introduction to Political Science

Week 15: Federalism and Decentralisation

Classes, Monday 17 February, 2020

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Reading Overview and Contemporary Example

- Clark, Golder, and Golder offer a three-feature conceptualisation of federalism that overlaps and contrasts with Auer's. Provide definitions of federal and unitary states (binary or spectral?), congruent and incongruent federalism (demographic overlaps), symmetric and asymmetric federalism (differing powers), devolution, decentralisation (measured through tax share), and coming-together versus holding-together (efficiency versus accommodating diversity).
- Bardhan focuses on the devolution of political decision-making power to local-level, small-scale entities in developing and transition economies. Identifies particular considerations in such situations: immobile populations, weak information and accounting systems, risks of elite capture, redistributive rather than efficiency goals, limited local taxation powers, and limited local technical capacity. Considers the efficiency-accountability trade-off of decentralisation and, extensively, capture.
- A contemporary example of (possible) federalism: [Failed Ukrainian Talks](#) then [Conflict](#).

Reading Overview and Contemporary Example



Clark, Golder, and Golder versus Auer

Clark, Golder, and Golder	Auer
1. Geopolitical division requires that the country be divided into mutually exclusive regional governments that are recognized in the constitution and that cannot be unilaterally abolished by the national government.	3. Participation of each level in the other (constituent unit representation at federal level (e.g. Senate), and federal concern for defending the rights and laws of the constituent units).
2. Independence requires that the regional and national governments must have independent bases of authority. This is typically ensured by having them elected independently of one another.	1. Autonomy of the constituent units.
3. Direct governance requires that authority be shared between the regional governments and the national government such that each citizen is governed by at least two authorities. Each level of government must have the authority to act independently of the other in at least one policy realm, and this authority must be protected by the constitution.	2. Superimposition, meaning the subordination of the constituent units to the superior legal order of the union.

The above attempts to map Clark, Golder, and Golder's definition of federalism on Auer's; you do not have to agree with this mapping. You may also want to think about how you would map the definition from the lecture (which may be preferable) onto these.