

Don't Forget...

The [Moodle forum on the summative exam](#), which currently covers questions and answers on the following topics:

- Detailed Knowledge of Readings for the First Short Answer
- Referencing in the First Short Answer
- The Definition(s) of Expressive Voting
- Exam Essay Answers as Condensed Versions of Normal Essays
- Linking Federalism to Decentralisation in Exam Answer
- Causes and Management of Ethnic Conflict

GV101

Introduction to Political Science

Week 22: Revision

Classes, Monday 04 May, 2020

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Order of Play


Prioritised topics:

- General Exam Information
- Week 15: Federalism and Decentralisation
- Week 13: Presidents, Ministers, and Parliaments

If we have time:

- Practice Essay Planning
- Other Weeks (16, 14, 12, and 21)

Revision Survey Prioritised Topics



General Exam Information: Specific Questions

Request 1: Guidance on the short answer section, working through past paper examples would be perfect!

Request 2: Please cover Down's theory of party competition.

Combined answer:

- What do we know about median voter theory, commonly associated with Downs (1957)?
 - Let's fill out the key points together...

General Exam Information: Specific Questions

Related questions:

- Is there perhaps a model answer for a regression table question?
- Can we have a recap of how to do regression analysis?
- Are there any particularly helpful points to focus on in the Short Answer regression analysis?

Answers:

- Look at the [Annotated Output](#) under Week 4 of the [GV101 page on Moodle](#).
- In terms of a general recap...




General Exam Information: Regression Recap

- a. Consider Model 1, what is the estimated effect of a 10% increase in the population aged 65 or over on the vote share supporting Leave?
- b. How does the estimated effect of the level of EU migration in a local authority on the vote share supporting Leave change from Model 1 to Model 2?
- c. To what extent does the change in significance of the coefficient relating to percentage of EU migrants affect our confidence in its relationship with support for Brexit? Why?




	Model 1	Model 2
% Age 65 and over	0.23* (0.10)	-0.33** (0.68)
% no education qualification	1.12** (0.07)	0.76** (0.05)
% EU migrants	-0.36 (0.19)	-0.34** (0.12)
UKIP vote share 2014		0.84*** (1.78)
Constant	27.11** (2.68)	18.34** (1.78)
Number of Observations	380	380
R-Squared	0.68	0.87

Note: * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%.
Source: Goodwin and Heath (2016)

General Exam Information: Regression Recap



General Exam Information: Regression Recap



General Exam Information: Specific Questions

Related Questions:

- How do summative essays differ from summer exam essays?
- To what depth are we expected to answer the essay questions?
- What standard is expected of us as far as the essays are concerned and could we have some examples for reference so we have something to model our modes of thinking on?

Answers (continued on next slide):

- As under exam conditions, write detailed essay plans (take about 5 minutes):
 - focus on the exam paper question (not some other question!)
 - make 1 key point in each paragraph
 - “critically engage” with the literature/research you have read
 - use empirical “regularities” and “facts” to support your argument
 - -> writing each essay is then just “joining the dots”

General Exam Information: Specific Questions

Answers (continued from previous slide):

- Each essay answer should be a maximum of 1,500 words long
 - This has changed from approximately 1,000 – 1,200 under exam conditions
- Reference key readings, using Harvard style, e.g. (Hix 2001)
 - This is expected to be done consistently and without error, which is a higher standard than under exam conditions
- You need to include a bibliography (not included in the word count):
 - This has changed from under exam conditions, when no bibliography was required
- In summary, the essay answers are now the same length as the formative essays, with referencing and bibliography provision expected to be at the same standard as an essay. As with any essay, outline and stick to your argument, have a clear structure, focus on key points, and support them with evidence including the key literature. Nevertheless, we appreciate that you have less time...

Week 15: Federalism and Decentralisation

Summary from the lecture:

- There are growing demands for more decentralisation in many established democracies (e.g. UK, Italy, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, India, USA)
- Federalism is a formal (and permanent) territorial division of power between the centre and the states
- Decentralisation of power can lead to more political accountability, more checks and balances, decreased ethnic conflicts, policy innovation, and better economic performance
- But, decentralisation of power can also lead to policy gridlock/ conflict, increased separatist demands, concerns about over-representation of some regions/states, negative policy spillovers, and pressure to reduce taxes and regulation

Week 15: Federalism and Decentralisation

- Clark, Golder, and Golder offer a three-feature conceptualisation of federalism that overlaps and contrasts with Auer's. Provide definitions of federal and unitary states (binary or spectral?), congruent and incongruent federalism (demographic overlaps), symmetric and asymmetric federalism (differing powers), devolution, decentralisation (measured through tax share), and coming-together versus holding-together (efficiency versus accommodating diversity).
- Bardhan focuses on the devolution of political decision-making power to local-level, small-scale entities in developing and transition economies. Identifies particular considerations in such situations: immobile populations, weak information and accounting systems, risks of elite capture, redistributive rather than efficiency goals, limited local taxation powers, and limited local technical capacity. Considers the efficiency-accountability trade-off of decentralisation and, extensively, capture.
- A contemporary example of (possible) federalism: [Failed Ukrainian Talks](#) then [Conflict](#).

Week 15: Federalism and Decentralisation

Clark, Golder, and Golder	Auer
1. Geopolitical division requires that the country be divided into mutually exclusive regional governments that are recognized in the constitution and that cannot be unilaterally abolished by the national government.	3. Participation of each level in the other (constituent unit representation at federal level (e.g. Senate), and federal concern for defending the rights and laws of the constituent units).
2. Independence requires that the regional and national governments must have independent bases of authority. This is typically ensured by having them elected independently of one another.	1. Autonomy of the constituent units.
3. Direct governance requires that authority be shared between the regional governments and the national government such that each citizen is governed by at least two authorities. Each level of government must have the authority to act independently of the other in at least on policy realm, and this authority must be protected by the constitution.	2. Superimposition, meaning the subordination of the constituent units to the superior legal order of the union.

Week 13: Presidents, Ministers, and Parliaments

Summary from the lecture:


- There are three main ways that democracies organise the relationship between the executive (the government) and the legislature (the parliament): presidential, parliamentary, and mixed/semi-presidential
- Presidential systems are characterised by separately elected leaders but powerful parliaments and weak political parties, and presidents are particularly weak if they do not command a majority in the parliament
- Parliamentary systems are characterised by powerful governments, weak parliaments, and powerful parties
- Semi-Presidential systems have powerful presidents if their government commands a parliamentary majority, but weak presidents if the majority in parliament (and the government) is from the opposing side

Week 13: Presidents, Ministers, and Parliaments

- Clark, Golder, and Golder give an overview of legislative responsibility and various types of vote of no confidence, and provide a neat distinction between parliamentary, presidential, and semi-presidential regimes.
- Linz thinks presidential systems are flawed for a whole host of reasons (the mandate given to the president, winner-takes-all elections, limits placed upon the president, rules of succession, dual legitimacy, and fixed terms) but particularly emphasises the idea that such systems often create an uncompromising leader in a system that expects compromise.
- Horowitz, with rhetorical flourishes, challenges Linz on the basis of case selection, his characterisation of presidentialism, diversity of presidential election systems, and the strengths of presidentialism.
- A contemporary example of the perils of presidentialism: [Venezuela](#).

FIGURE 11.1

Classifying Parliamentary, Presidential, and Mixed Democracies



Source: Cheibub 2007, 35.

Practice Essay Planning

In your groups:

- If you haven't already got copies, download the past papers from [Moodle](#) (GV101 > Course Information and News Forum > Joe Greenwood's Classes > Week 22 Revision)
- Choose an essay question and collectively write a plan for how to answer it. Put it on Padlet, along with any comments:
 - padlet.com/j_greenwood3/GV101A
 - padlet.com/j_greenwood3/GV101B

I will then:

- Allow a few minutes for you to get started before dropping in on each group to discuss your plans and any questions that you have.

Week 16: Independent Institutions

Summary from the lecture:

- Courts and Central Banks are examples of independent ('non-majoritarian') institutions – political institutions which are not directly elected, but have significant power to influence policy outcomes
- Other examples of 'non-majoritarian' institutions are competition authorities (e.g. Cartel Office), market regulators (e.g. telecoms), environment agencies, the EU Commission etc.
- Principal-Agent Theory is a tool-kit for conceptualising the relationship between politicians and these independent institutions
- How the rules of appointment and decision-making work, together with the policy preferences of the politicians and the agents, will determine how far the independent institutions are able to shape policy outcomes

Week 16: Independent Institutions

- Thatcher and Stone Sweet introduce the Principal-Agent (P-A) framework as a way to understand non-majoritarian institutions (NMIs), note its limitations as a causal theory, and outline the associated ideas of agency loss (policy drift) and a 'zone of discretion'. Provide an overview of the criticisms of the P-A approach levelled in the journal volume that their article appears in, and the responses that attempt to address those problems from alternative perspectives. Argue that NMIs have often become more powerful than their initial 'zones of discretion' suggest, that they have empowered groups that might lose through politics, and have impacted on important policy areas (e.g. competition, EU integration, economic liberalisation, individual rights, government secrecy, inflation). Finally, note that the legitimacy of NMIs has been questioned.
- Choi, Gulati, and Posner analyse data on the decisions of judges in the highest courts in each U.S. state between 1998 and 2000, considering the manner in which they are selected. Find that elected judges write more legal opinions than do appointed judges, but have fewer citations per opinion. Further, contrary to the prevailing view (that appointed judges are better than elected judges), find that there is no clear relationship between selection method and judicial independence (measured by how frequently they dissent against judges from the same party). Finally, find that judges in small states perform better than those in large states.
- A contemporary example of an 'independent' institution: [DRC Electoral Commission](#).

Week 14: Coalitions and Single Party Government

Summary from the lecture:

- Democracies can have single-party or coalitions governments, and majority or minority governments
- Office-seeking theories predict that minimum-winning coalitions will form and that cabinet seats will be allocated in proportion to parties' seat-shares
- Policy-seeking theories predict that connected coalitions will form, between parties next to each other on a policy dimension, and that parties will bargain about the content of a 'coalition agreement'
- Single-party governments tend to be more stable, more decisive and more accountable (with higher 'clarity of responsibility')
- Coalition governments tend to be more consensual and more representative (closer to the median voter)

Week 14: Coalitions and Single-Party Government

- Clark, Golder, and Golder outline a shedload of concepts: ministerial responsibility, collective cabinet responsibility, an investiture vote, the formateur, a caretaker government, office-seeking and policy-seeking politicians, Gamson's law, (least) minimum winning coalition, connected coalition, minority government, surplus majority government, preelectoral coalition, and government coalition. They also highlight three possible ways that a government might set an election based on the economy (political surfing, political business cycle, or signalling), and give an overview of Huber and Martinez-Gallardo (further reading from Week 12).
- Tsebelis applies veto players theory and does empirical work to demonstrate that a greater number of coalition partners, and a greater range of positions in a coalition, is negatively associated with the number of significant pieces of (labour) legislation, and negatively associated with the variance in the number of such policies passed.
- A contemporary example of coalition formation: Multi-party coalition formation task.

Week 12: How Government Works

Summary from the lecture:

- There is a wide range of institutional designs of democracy
- Lijphart's distinction between majoritarian and consensus democracy is a useful summary of the main models of democratic government
- The classic majoritarian model is single-party government in a parliamentary system (e.g. Westminster)
- There are lots of different consensus models, e.g. presidentialism, coalition government, federalism, bicameralism etc.
- Tsebelis's veto player theory helps us understand the political and policy implications of the different models of democracy, e.g.
 - "If an exogenous shock occurs, a government with many veto players with big ideological distances among them cannot handle the situation and cannot agree on the necessary policies" (Tsebelis, 2002, p.185)

Week 12: How Government Works

- Clark, Golder, and Golder give an overview of veto players (Tsebelis) the differences between majoritarian and consensus democracies (Lijphart), considering features such as type of representative, electoral system, party-system, type of government, centres of state power, number of legislative chambers, constitutional supremacy, and overarching regime type. Also consider the four types of representation (Pitkin) and how they relate to the preceding institutions.
- Lijphart is the originator of the differentiation between majoritarian and consensus democracy, but is concerned not only with that differentiation but also the implications of these approaches to democracy for representation and government effectiveness [which paper that we've read can be linked to this?].
- A contemporary example of a veto player: [take a wild guess](#).

Week 12: How Government Works




Figure 1.2. Winset and core of a system with three veto players.




Figure 1.3. Winset and core of a system with four veto players.

Week 12: How Government Works




Figure 1.9. Importance of agenda setting decreases with more veto players and increases with the central location of agenda setter.

Week 21: Politics in Ethnically Divided Societies

Summary from the lecture:


- Most countries in the world either already have multi-ethnic societies (from existing ethnic divisions or previous immigration) or are becoming multi-ethnic societies (as a result of immigration)
- This presents a range of challenges for democratic politics, e.g.:
 - conflictual political preferences
 - minority rights vs. common norms
 - representation of minorities in politics & policy-making
 - competition for public resources
- Some empirical regularities:
 - Multicultural/pluralist policies are correlated with more tolerant societies
 - “Power sharing” can (sometimes) work in ethnically-divided societies
 - Conflict can often be “instrumental”, i.e. only salient when mobilized
 - PR systems are better than majoritarian systems in ethnically-divided societies

Week 21: Politics in Ethnically Divided Societies

- Posner uses a combination of a natural experiment (the drawing of the border) and survey research to examine the relations between the Chewa and Tumbuka tribes in Malawi and Zambia. Finds that social and political divisions between the tribes (measured through surveys undertaken in four villages; one per tribe on each side of the border) are stronger in Malawi, and argues that this is because the (large) size of the groups relative to the population there make them politically salient. By contrast, in Zambia the two groups constitute a small percentage of the population and are subsumed within the broader 'Easterner' group, which is large enough to be politically salient.
- Huber develops four empirical measures of 'ethnicization' of electoral behaviour that accommodate differing features: group-based or party-based, and fractionalisation or polarisation. With these measures established, he runs a series of OLS regressions on data from the World Values Survey (WVS), Afrobarometer, and Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), showing a consistent negative relationship between proportionality of electoral system and ethnicization of electoral behaviour. In other words, more proportional electoral systems tend to be associated with lower levels of ethnicization of electoral behaviour.
- Historical example of politics in ethnically divided societies: [Bergesen and Herman](#) article, [ABC News report](#), and [New York Times report](#) on the [1992 L.A. riots / uprising](#).

Week 21: Politics in Ethnically Divided Societies

FIGURE 1 Examples of Group- and Party-Based Ethnicization



Group-based ethnicization < Party-based ethnicization



Group-based ethnicization > Party-based ethnicization