First question: Selectorate theory assumes that any leader’s goal is to stay in office and maximise rents. Are there clear cases in the world today of autocrats that do not fit that description? I.e. ‘benevolent dictators’ who deliver more public goods than are needed to satisfy their winning coalition? If so, why might that be?

Answer: The examples that spring to mind in answer to this question are a number of regimes in the Middle East that have high levels of public good provision (at least in some senses) despite being dictatorships with small winning coalitions (e.g. Saudi Arabia). The explanations in this case may be related to the immense wealth that such regimes possess; even if a very large proportion of that wealth is retained by the ruling family, they can still afford to spend significant sums on public goods. More specifically, increased spending by such regimes was observed in response to the Arab Spring, and I think this points towards an explanation that lies outside selectorate theory. The starting assumption of the theory is that the disenfranchised population has little or no say in the regime’s survival, for which only the selectorate and, more so, the winning coalition are key. However, it is possible to imagine the disenfranchised section of the population in dictatorship mobilising to pose a threat to the regime (or even just that the threat of such mobilisation exists), and that the regime would respond to this, for instance by increasing public spending. Further to this, and more broadly, it is worth noting that the authors have responded to previous criticism but that selectorate theory has come in for additional criticism subsequently, for example in the following articles:

• Kennedy (2009). ‘Survival and Accountability: An Analysis of the Empirical Support for “Selectorate Theory”.’
• Arena and Nicoletti (2014). ‘Selectorate theory, the democratic peace, and public goods provision.’
• Gallagher and Hansen (2015). ‘Power Tool or Dull Blade? Selectorate Theory for Autocracies.’

Second question: How does selectorate theory fit with the fact that there exists applied research in e.g. development economics which recommends policies to alleviate poverty, effectively spend on public health, etc? When autocrats take such advice, are they just responding to pressure from their winning coalition which has grown?

Answer: I would say that advice stemming from such research is likely to emanate from international organisations and this indicates another factor that is external to selectorate theory: external pressure. It is difficult to conceptualise such pressure, which may come with important economic implications in terms of aid or trade, within the selectorate theory framework, though this does not necessarily mean that the two explanations are mutually exclusive. To the extent that autocrats respond to such advice when it emanates from within their countries, we might think that it would be a reflection of the propositions of selectorate theory. Of course, selectorate theory does not suggest that autocracies with small winning coalitions will never provide public goods, just that they are less likely to do so. So, autocrats with small winning coalitions may respond to research-led advice on multiple occasions but, on average, still do so less frequently (and effectively) than autocracies with large winning coalitions (or democracies).