Question: I was wondering if you could explain the recent political turmoil in several Southern American countries [at the time of writing: 11.11.2019] – where did come from and why, and how do you think this will play out for democracy?

Answer: Thanks a lot for the message; these are great (and big) questions!

I’ll take two examples of what you’re talking about as illustrative:

 – Evo Morales stepping down as president of Bolivia, in response to protests that emerged from a disputed presidential election: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/11/world/americas/evo-morales-renuncia.html

 – Chile’s president, Sebastián Piñera, agreeing to the drafting of a new constitution following protests sparked by rising public transport costs: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/11/world/americas/chile-protests-new-constitution.html

In each of the above cases, there is a specific issue identified as the cause of the unrest: in Bolivia, it was concerns over the president’s disregard for the constitution, and term limits in particular, and the threat that it posed to the country’s democracy; in Chile, it was frustration over the constitutionally defined limits on the state to intervene in the economy (stemming from the era of the Pinochet dictatorship), which has implications for inequality and the cost of living.

The above specific causes are important, and should not be discounted, but we are often also interested in common underlying factors that lead to phenomena (such as protest or government breakdown) in multiple cases. In this light, it is interesting to refer to the readings from our week on ‘Regimes: Presidents, Ministers, and Parliaments’, a number of which relate to impact of the choice between presidentialism and parliamentarism on government and regime stability. Drawing on his observation of regime instability in South America at the time, Linz argued that the problem was the adoption of presidential systems that caused deadlock between legislatures and executives. Horowitz argues against this, noting that Linz’s case selection is limited and that stable presidential systems can be designed if electoral systems are chosen wisely. As we will see in that week’s lecture, the combination of presidentialism with an electoral system leading to many parties in the legislature (as is the case in Chile) may be problematic because it creates too many veto players (causing gridlock).

There is also an interesting consideration about what causes protests to spread once they have begun. If there has been underlying discontent for some time, why do lots of people pick that moment to protest? There are lots of answers to this but, from our week on ‘Interest Groups and Social Movements: Why Mobilise?’, Kuran has argued that there could be a bandwagon effect (as more people protest, other people pass the threshold at which they become willing to do so as well) whilst Farrell examines the ways in which the internet (and social media) may play a part.

So, to summarise the answer to your first question, there may be long-term underlying causes such as the design of the constitution (and challenges that may pose for effective government) coupled with immediate political or policy concerns (a decreasingly democratic president, or inequality and the cost of living) that drive a protest bandwagon effect assisted by the ease of internet-based communications.

As for your second question, I am reasonably optimistic about the outcomes for democracy in the cases of Bolivia and Chile. The military had refused to defend the outgoing president in Bolivia but has not attempted to become involved in the government. In Chile, the protests are not anti-democratic and have forced compromise (though maybe not enough) from the president. In both cases, it seems like we are observing the important role of protest in democracy. There may be other countries however, such as Venezuela, where there is less cause for optimism.

I hope this answers your questions!