First question: Is democracy inevitable for China if it keeps on growing economically, as suggested in Why Nations Fail (possibly due to a series of revolutions that end in democratic stability)?

Answer: No, I wouldn’t say that democracy is inevitable in China, even if the economy continues to grow. Indeed, I would be hesitant to say that any of the relationships that we talk about between economics, culture, and democracy imply inevitable consequences. Remember that, because we talk about trends amongst many cases, we are dealing with probabilistic relationships. There will always be exceptions to the tendencies that we observe and this should not surprise us. What is interesting is the point at which there are so many exceptions, or such a significant exception (which I think China constitutes), that we need to think about revising the theory that implies the tendency we have observed previously. As it stands, I think we can still have a theory that says that, generally, as economies grow they are more likely to become, and remain, democracies, and also try to develop our ideas about why China is an exception to this. Of course, as we’ve considered previously, we still don’t know what the causal direction of the relationships between economics, culture, and democracy is, and it may be that examining the case of China sheds light on this.

Second question: Does the degree to which culture vs economics predicts changes through Modernisation Theory vary across countries/regions/etc?

Answer: This is an empirical question that we could probably answer by analysing existing data on countries. However, let’s deal with it theoretically: I think it’s a plausible proposition; it seems likely that the influence of economic change might vary depending on culture and that the influence of culture might vary depending on economic development. So, some countries might have particular cultural features (e.g. strict social structure) that limit the influence of economic change to bring about political change (though it may still increase the likelihood of such change) whilst other countries do not. Similarly, it might be that economic development washes out the power of culture (e.g. through increasing links with other countries) so that the influence of culture is less in economically developed countries. However, it also seems plausible that economic development could increase the power of culture; as people attain economic security they seek to instead emphasise the cultural issues that are important to them (indeed, at the individual level, this relates to the arguments of Inglehart and Norris).

Third question: Does Selectorate Theory imply that the CCP is not shooting itself in the foot with economic development in the long run?

Answer: Can you explain why you think this would be the case? What about selectorate theory suggests that economic development would undermine a dictatorial regime such as China?

• Clarification: On “Does Selectorate Theory imply that the CCP is not shooting itself in the foot with economic development in the long run?”: I think selectorate theory can imply that, when done right, economic development (through policy concessions) would not undermine a dictatorial regime, while economic modernisation theory states that economic development tends to do so. In light of these two, it could be said that giving too many policy spoils (leading to economic growth) may increase the chance of a democratic transition. So, the question was: Could the CCP’s policy concessions be seen as a mistake since it may heighten the chance of democracy in the long run?
  • Answer: This is an interesting question. I would say that this is a logical implication of combining the two theories; selectorate theory suggests that China delivers a high level of public goods, including economic growth, because it has a large selectorate and, crucially, winning coalition (given that it is a single-party regime with a large number of party members), but that this could ultimately make it more difficult to avoid a transition to democracy (if we believe that modernisation theory is correct). Of course, we can also use selectorate theory to suggest that the provision of public goods by the Chinese state will keep the selectorate and the winning coalition happy and thus reduce the likelihood of the latter defecting, or of any significant opposition movement emerging within the selectorate (or from the population outside the selectorate). This would imply a flaw in modernisation theory: if non-democratic regimes deliver economic growth and distribute public goods to enough people in the winning coalition (and selectorate, and even the population) then they can avert significant calls for democracy that might be expected as a consequence of economic development (though this might be contingent on also respecting property rights, as many non-democratic regimes do).

Fourth question: And are the HK protests linked to a progression of this kind in some way?

Answer: Do you mean linked to economic development or to selectorate theory? If the former, I am inclined to say that economic development is not a key driver in the Hong Kong protests; the events that precipitated the protests were related to a law that would have enabled extradition of Hong Kong citizens for trial in mainland China. The protestors object to the growing influence of China in Hong Kong and felt that this was a step too far, so it seems to be a reasonably straightforward attempt to defend the political rights that they have (which emerged from the deal between the UK and China when Hong Kong was returned to the latter by the former). Given that China tolerates significant economic inequality it seems less likely to me that people in Hong Kong are concerned that the CCP is intent on redistributing their relatively high levels of wealth and income, so I don’t think that economics significantly underpins the protest. If you’re thinking of selectorate theory, we might see the protests as an attempt by an existing selectorate (given the, admittedly limited, rights of Hong Kong citizens to influence the makeup of their local government) to protect their status as such. We can also see the protesters as an alternative winning coalition to the incumbent government in Hong Kong or, if we perceive the influence of the CCP as high, as a group outside the selectorate organising to try and become part of the selectorate. I don’t know enough to say which of those interpretations is most accurate but we can certainly use the ideas of selectorate theory to analyse what is happening in Hong Kong.

• Clarification: On “And are the HK protests linked to a progression of this kind in some way?”: In terms of economic development, the question was more about the long run. Had Hong Kong not experienced the economic growth it did, would protests have been less likely because people would have had bigger, more immediate concerns (this also relates to the arguments of Inglehart and Norris)? And would the CCP value the popular support of Hong Kong politicians as much as they do when selecting leaders today?
  • Answer: I see what you mean; it may be that the longstanding high levels of economic development in Hong Kong are what ultimately underpin a commitment to democracy there, and this suggests that once some level of democratic practice and values are established in an economically developed country or region it can be hard to subsequently remove them (in line with the survival story, which also implies that if China were to transition to democracy it would be difficult to reverse that move because of the high levels of economic development (at least amongst large sections of the population)). Of course, this does not contradict the above answer; if the transition to democratic practice and values is not undertaken then it appears possible for non-democratic regimes to survive despite (or because of) economic growth. As for the CCP valuing the popular support of politicians in Hong Kong, I’m not sure how true that is, and their continued support for Carrie Lam despite mass public opposition (and the fact that Hong Kong elections are democratic in a limited sense) suggests that they are more concerned with other factors.

Fifth question: You implied that Chinese economic development may mean that some models of democratic transition need to be revised, or adjusted in their probabilistic predictions. Could one way of revising be to connect Modernisation Theory to Selectorate Theory and institutionalisation (Week 3 paper) in the following way? Economic development makes democracy more likely but this can be largely mitigated by dictatorial leaders that optimally/overly institutionalise (or receive information about its selectorate in another way). In brief, for China, economic causes of democracy are undermined because its government/dictator is particularly skilled in holding power.

Answer: You’re right that I implied this but it is also a matter of judgement; one could argue that China is just a normal exception to a tendency, which we always expect to see in probabilistic relationships. However, given its prominence, it may call modernisation theory into question and, in that case, your proposed combination of theories certainly makes sense. Skilled dictatorial regimes with large selectorates and, crucially, winning coalitions are best off providing public goods (including economic growth that might otherwise suggest democratisation) to keep those groups (and even the population at large) happy. However, they would also be sensible (as per Gandhi and Pzeworski) to optimally institutionalise by incorporating potential opposition forces into partisan legislatures (i.e. co-opting them), which also provides information to the regime on that opposition (as you observe). Further, Magaloni would argue that they need to go a step further and have some sort of credible (if limited) electoral mechanism in place so that there is a manner by which those opposition forces can legitimately exercise some power (without needing to challenge the whole system from outside it).